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We investigate a two-part tariff licensing contract that enables an incumbent innovator to license the
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for an imperfectly substitutable product. We identify the optimal two-part tariff licensing contract based
on the development cost incurred by the rival, the market parameter, and the substitution coefficient.
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Patent licensing plays an important role in the development
of technology. In particular, inward technology licensing has been
used by firms as alternative sources of new product to internal
R&D; see Atuahene-Gima (1992). Kulatilaka and Lin (2006) give
some examples of licensing of new product technology in the
pharmaceutical industry. We consider licensing by a patent-
holding firm to its potential rival, whomay invest in the technology
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0165-1765 © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NCinnovation and enter the market of the new product. We examine
the class of two-part tariff contracts consisting of a fixed fee plus
a linear royalty per unit of output and identify the optimal two-
part tariff contract for the patent holder. This depends on the
cost of technology innovation incurred by the potential rival, the
substitutability of goods, and the market parameter. We focus
attention on the cost of technology innovation, which represents
the strength of the patent.
The analysis of patent licensing was initiated by Arrow (1962).
There are two streams of research on patent licensing. One
concerns patent licensing by outsiders and focuses on the licensing
of a cost-reducing innovation by a specialist R&D firm whose sole
objective is to license the patent to other firms; see Kamien (1992)
for a survey. In the other strand, the R&D environment is one in
-SA license.
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(see, e.g., Taylor and Silberston, 1973). The issues addressed by
researchers on licensing include asymmetric cost structures of
firms in a duopoly (Gallini and Winter, 1985; Marjit, 1990), the
impact of the magnitude of the cost-reducing innovation (Wang,
1998, 2002; Kamien and Tauman, 2002; Martín and Saracho,
2010),1 and the cost of technology innovation (Kulatilaka and Lin,
2006; Kitagawa et al., 2013). These authors consider licensing
based on a pure fixed fee or pure royalty licensing, and investigate
the effectiveness of licensing. Based on his survey of corporate
licensing in the United States, Rostoker (1984) finds that 46% of the
licensing contracts use a downpayment plus a running royalty, 39%
use royalties alone, and 13% use a fixed fee alone. Combinations
of fixed fees and royalties are most often observed in practice.
There is little research on two-part tariff contracts in which the
innovator is one of the incumbent producers. Two exceptions are
Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002) and Sen and Tauman (2007),2 both
of which address the impact of the magnitude of the cost-reducing
innovation. Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002) consider the two-part
tariff licensing of a cost-reducing innovation in a differentiated
Bertrand and Cournot duopoly. They conclude that the optimal
contract involves a positive royalty for both types of duopoly.
Sen and Tauman (2007) consider the licensing of a cost-reducing
innovation when the innovator uses a two-part tariff licensing
contract in a Cournot oligopoly of general size. They analyze the
case of an outside innovator as well as an incumbent innovator,
obtain the optimal licensing scheme for each case, and compare
the incentives of the innovators to innovate.
Our approach is new in that we focus on two-part tariff
licensing by an incumbent innovator who competes with a
potential rival who may self-develop the technology. First, unlike
most researchers in the literature, we assume that the incumbent
innovator has a technology for a new good that can be licensed
to a potential rival, who has the option of self-developing a
compatible technology to produce an imperfect substitute for the
new good without patent infringement. The main feature of our
model is the cost of technology development. That is, we obtain
results based on two types of scenarios for the development cost.
When the potential rival does not have a license, it can enter
the market by investing in technology development. However,
if the development cost is high, such entry is not profitable for
the rival. We call this cost scenario the high development cost
scenario. The scenario in which this is not the case is termed
as the low development cost scenario. The cost of technology
development represents the strength of the patent because a
strong patent implies that the cost of developing a compatible
technology without patent infringement is high for the potential
rival.3 Second, we investigate the class of two-part tariff licensing
contracts, which includes the two special cases of pure royalty and
pure fixed-fee licensing. Thus, the optimal two-part tariff licensing
contract analyzed in this paper weakly dominates the two special
cases investigated by Kitagawa et al. (2013).
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. The technol-
ogy of the patent holder is licensed except for the case of homoge-
neous goods with a high development cost. The optimal two-part
tariff involves a positive royalty rate, exceptwhen the twoproducts
1 A cost-reducing innovation is said to be drastic if the monopoly price under the
new technology does not exceed the competitive price under the old technology;
see Arrow (1962).
2 For the case of outside innovators, optimal two-part tariff contracts are
investigated by, e.g., Erutku and Richelle (2007), Sen and Tauman (2007), and Sen
and Stamatopoulos (2009).
3 Thus, the high development cost scenario and the low development cost sce-
nario roughly reflect the cases of drastic and nondrastic innovations, respectively,
identified by Arrow (1962).do not compete, in which case, pure fixed-fee licensing prevails.
These findings are consistent with the analysis of Fauli-Oller and
Sandonis (2002) for the case of a cost-reducing innovation. When
the patent is weak, the incumbent offers a pure royalty contract.
Furthermore, the optimal royalty rate and the optimal fixed fee are
nondecreasing in the development cost.
2. The model
Suppose that the incumbent (firm 1) with a technology for
a new product uses two-part tariff licensing to license its own
technology to a potential rival (firm 2), whomay alternatively self-
develop the technology for an imperfectly substitutable product.
Under the two-part tariff contract, firm 2 pays a lump sum
of ϕ ≥ 0, which is independent of the level of production, and
a royalty rate of r ≥ 0 per unit of production. Hereafter, we
denote such a two-part tariff contract by (r, ϕ). In period 0, firm 1
decides whether to offer licensing to firm 2. If firm 1 does not offer
licensing to firm 2, firm 2 has two options in period 1. Firm 2 may
stay out of the market or enter the market by self-developing the
technology. If firm 2 invests in its own technology development,
it incurs a cost of J > 0,4 and the development succeeds without
patent infringement. If firm 1 offers licensing, firm 2may accept or
reject this offer in period 1. In the latter case, firm 2 may refrain
from competition or may enter the market by self-developing
the technology. We assume that firm 2 accepts the offer if firm
2 is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer. We
also assume that firm 2 enters the market if firm 2 is indifferent
between entering and not entering. For analytical convenience, we
further assume that firm 1 does not offer a contract if firm 1 is
indifferent between offering and not offering one.
In period 2, if firm 2 enters themarket, both firms engage in the
Cournot competition. Otherwise, firm 1 monopolizes the market.
Even if the two firms have identical technology, the products of
the two firms may be differentiated. Firm i’s product demand
qi, i = 1, 2, is given by the inverse demand function Pi =
θ − qi−aqj, i, j = 1, 2, j ≠ i, where Pi is the price of firm i’s
product. We call the parameters θ > 0 and a ∈ [0, 1] the market
parameter and the substitution coefficient, respectively. If firm 2
accepts firm 1’s offer (r, ϕ), then firm 1 charges firm 2 a licensing
fee of rq2 + ϕ.
3. Analysis
LetΠNi (j) be firm i’s profit under the ‘‘no license’’ policy in sce-
nario j, where j ∈ {ℓ, h} denotes ‘‘low’’ and ‘‘high’’, respectively. Let
Jˆ ≡ θ2
(a+2)2 . Lemma 1 below shows that when no license is offered,
firm 2 enters the market if and only if the development cost J is
less than or equal to Jˆ . Hereafter, J > (≤)Jˆ characterizes the high
(low) development cost scenario. Moreover, we say that the patent
is strong (weak) in the high (low) development cost scenario.
Consider the subgame that starts after firm 1 chooses not to li-
cense in period 0. If firm 2 stays out of the market, firm 1 monop-
olizes the market and maximizes its payoff Π1 = (θ − q1)q1 by
choosing optimal output of q∗1 = θ/2. The payoffs of the firms are
given by (Π1,Π2) = ( 14θ2, 0). If firm 2 enters the market, the two
firms engage in the Cournot competition and have payoff functions
ofΠ1 = (θ − q1−aq2)q1 andΠ2 = (θ − q2−aq1)q2. The equilib-
riumoutputs are q∗1 = q∗2 = θa+2 with payoffs of ( θ
2
(a+2)2 ,
θ2
(a+2)2 −J).
Thus, we obtain the following lemma.
4 When J = 0, our model is reduced to the Cournot duopoly.
T. Kitagawa et al. / Economics Letters 123 (2014) 227–231 229Lemma 1. Consider the subgame that starts after firm 1 chooses
not to license. If J > Jˆ , firm 2 stays out of the market and
firm 1 monopolizes the market, which results in payoffs of (ΠN1 (h),
ΠN2 (h)) ≡ ( 14θ2, 0). If J ≤ Jˆ , firm 2 enters themarket, and the payoffs
are (ΠN1 (ℓ),Π
N
2 (ℓ)) ≡

θ2
(a+2)2 ,
θ2
(a+2)2 − J

.
We next examine the subgame that starts after firm 1 chooses
to offer a two-part tariff contract (r, ϕ). If the royalty rate is too
high, firm 2 does not produce output after it accepts the offer. The
next lemma shows that the condition that corresponds to this case
is
r > rˆ ≡ −a+ 2
2
θ.
Lemma 2. Consider the subgame that starts after firm 1 offers the
contract (r, ϕ) and firm 2 accepts it. The payoffs from this subgame
are
(Π1,Π2) =


π∗1 (r, ϕ), π
∗
2 (r, ϕ)

if r ≤ rˆ,
1
4
θ2 + ϕ,−ϕ

if r > rˆ,
where
π∗1 (r, ϕ) =
(3a2 − 8)r2 + (a3 − 4a2 + 8)θr + (a− 2)2θ2
(a2 − 4)2 + ϕ,
(1)
π∗2 (r, ϕ) =
(2r + (a− 2)θ)2
(a2 − 4)2 − ϕ. (2)
Proof. In this subgame, the Cournot competition is represented
by maxq1≥0 π1 = (θ − q1−aq2)q1 + rq2 + ϕ and maxq2≥0 π2 =
(θ − q2−aq1 − r)q2 − ϕ. The first-order conditions imply that
when the royalty rate is low (high), i.e., r ≤ rˆ(r > rˆ), a duopoly (a
monopoly) emerges with
(q∗1, q
∗
2) =


θ
a+ 2 +
ar
−a2 + 4 ,
θ
a+ 2 −
2r
−a2 + 4

if r ≤ rˆ,
θ
2
, 0

if r > rˆ.
The lemma then follows from simple calculation. 
3.1. The high development cost scenario
Under the high development cost scenario (J > Jˆ), we obtain
the following result.
Theorem 3. Under the high development cost scenario, the equilib-
rium path is as follows. When 0 ≤ a < 1, firm 1 offers (r∗, ϕ∗h ) and
firm 2 accepts it, where
r∗ ≡ a(a− 2)
2
2(−3a2 + 4) θ, ϕ
∗
h ≡
4(a− 1)2
(3a2 − 4)2 θ
2, (3)
and the payoffs are
π∗1 (r
∗, ϕ∗h ), π
∗
2 (r
∗, ϕ∗h )
 =  a2 − 8a+ 8
4(−3a2 + 4) θ
2, 0

. (4)
When a = 1, firm 1 offers no contract, which results in payoffs of
(ΠN1 (h),Π
N
2 (h)).
Proof. Because the patent is strong (J > Jˆ), firm 2 does not enter
the market, having rejected the offer. We first identify the set of
contracts that firm 2 accepts. Lemma 2 shows that, for r ≤ rˆ , firm
2 accepts the offer (r, ϕ) if and only if π∗2 (r, ϕ) ≥ ΠN2 (h) = 0, orequivalently,
ϕ ≤ (2r + (a− 2)θ)
2
(a2 − 4)2 . (5)
For r > rˆ , firm 2 accepts the offer (r, ϕ) if and only if −ϕ ≥
ΠN2 (h) = 0, or equivalently,
ϕ = 0. (6)
In this case, because firm 2 produces nothing, firm 1 has a
monopoly. We next consider the equilibrium contract. Consider
the set of contracts (r, ϕ) with r ≤ rˆ . Eqs. (1) and (5) imply that
the best contract (r, ϕ) in this set satisfies
ϕ = ϕh(r) ≡ (2r + (a− 2)θ)
2
(a2 − 4)2 ≥ 0. (7)
Thus, substituting (7) into (1) yields a payoff for firm 1 of
π∗1 (r, ϕh(r)) =
(3a2 − 4)r2 + a(a− 2)2θr + 2(a− 2)2θ2
(a2 − 4)2 . (8)
This equation is quadratic in r and is maximized at r = r∗ in (3),
which implies a payoff of π∗1 (r∗, ϕh(r∗)) = a
2−8a+8
4(−3a2+4)θ
2. Simple
calculation reveals that 0 ≤ r∗ ≤ rˆ . Thus, (r∗, ϕh(r∗)) is the
best offer in the set of acceptable contracts with r ≤ rˆ . Next, we
consider the set of contracts (r, ϕ) with r > rˆ . If r > rˆ , then from
Lemmas 1, 2, and (6), firm 1’s payoff is
Π1 =

1
4
θ2 if ϕ > 0, so that firm 2 rejects the contract,
1
4
θ2 + ϕ = 1
4
θ2 if ϕ = 0, so that firm 2 accepts
the nil contract.
Thus, r > rˆ implies that firm 1’s payoff is 14θ
2. Combining these
results yields
Π1 = max
 1
4θ
2, π∗1 (r
∗, ϕh(r∗))

.
It can be verified that π∗1 (r∗, ϕh(r∗)) ≥ 14θ2 with equality only
if a = 1. Hence, a < 1 implies that firm 1 offers (r∗, ϕ∗h ) and
firm 2 accepts it, where ϕ∗h ≡ ϕh(r∗). If a = 1, firm 1 offers no
contract. 
From Eq. (3), the royalty rate is increasing and the fixed fee
is decreasing in the substitution coefficient a. This implies that
charging a royalty is effective for the patent holder in a highly
competitive market.
3.2. The low development cost scenario
In this subsection, we analyze the low development cost
scenario, characterized by (J ≤ Jˆ). Recall that, under the low
development cost scenario, if firm 2 does not accept a contract,
it self-develops the technology and obtains a payoff of ΠN2 (ℓ) =
θ2
(a+2)2 − J . We consider two cases: (i) J < Jˆ and (ii) J = Jˆ .
Consider Case (i). If firm 2 self-develops the technology, its
payoff isΠN2 (ℓ) > 0. Consider a contract (r, ϕ) with r > rˆ . If firm
2 accepts this contract, according to Lemma 2, its payoff cannot
exceed zero. This implies that firm 2 does not accept the contract
and instead invests in the technology to enter the market. Then,
firm 1’s payoff is ΠN1 (ℓ) = θ
2
(a+2)2 . Next consider a contract with
r ≤ rˆ . Firm 2 accepts (r, ϕ) if and only if π∗2 (r, ϕ) ≥ ΠN2 (ℓ) (see
(2)) or, equivalently,
ϕ ≤ ϕℓ(r) ≡ 4r(r + (a− 2)θ)
(a2 − 4)2 + J. (9)
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Π1(r, ϕ) =

π∗1 (r, ϕ) if (9) and r ≤ rˆ hold (if firm 2
accepts the offer),
θ2
(a+ 2)2 otherwise (if firm 2 rejects the offer).
(10)
Because contract (0, J) satisfies (9),π∗1 (0, J) = θ
2
(a+2)2 +J and J > 0,
in order to maximize Π1(r, ϕ), it is sufficient to consider only the
first case in (10). From (1), for (r, ϕ) to maximize π∗1 (r, ϕ) subject
to the constraints (9) and r ≤ rˆ in (10), it must be the case that
ϕ = ϕℓ(r) and ϕℓ(r) ≥ 0. It is apparent that ϕℓ(r) ≥ 0 if and only
if
r ≤ r˜ ≡ −a+ 2
2

θ −

θ2 − (a+ 2)2J

. (11)
Note that 0 < r˜ < rˆ . Hence, firm 1’s payoff can be written as
Π1 = max
0≤r≤r˜
π∗1 (r, ϕℓ(r)), (12)
where
π∗1 (r, ϕℓ(r)) =
(3a2 − 4)r2 + a(a− 2)2θr + (a− 2)2θ2
(a2 − 4)2 + J. (13)
Because Eq. (13) is identical to (8) apart from the constant term, it
follows thatπ∗1 (r, ϕℓ(r)) ismaximized at r∗ ≥ 0 in (3). This implies
that (12) is maximized either at r∗ or at the corner solution r˜ . Let
M(J) ≡ r˜ − r∗. Then,M(J) ≥ 0 if and only if
J ≥ J˜ ≡ a(a− 2)(5a
2 + 2a− 8)θ2
(a+ 2)2(3a2 − 4)2 . (14)
Calculations then reveal that
J˜ ≤ Jˆ. (15)
Firm 1’s profit, Π1 in (12), is either π∗1 (r∗, ϕℓ(r∗)) or π
∗
1 (r˜, ϕℓ(r˜))
depending on whether J ≥ J˜ or J < J˜ , where ϕℓ(r˜) = 0.
Next, we consider Case (ii). The argument is similar to Case (i).
When J = Jˆ , it follows thatΠN2 (ℓ) = 0. Note thatΠN1 (ℓ) = θ
2
(a+2)2 .
Consider a contract with r > rˆ . From Lemma 2, the only contract
accepted by firm 2 is (r, 0), which is a contract with payoffs of
( θ
2
4 , 0). Note that
θ2
4 ≥ ΠN1 (ℓ) = θ
2
(a+2)2 with equality only if a = 0.
Thus, if a > 0, firm 1’s best offer based on a royalty rate above rˆ
is (r, 0), with any r > rˆ , which has a payoff of θ
2
4 . If a = 0, firm
1 does not offer any (r, ϕ) with r > rˆ . Now consider a contract
with r ≤ rˆ . As in Case (i), firm 1’s payoff can be written as (12),
with π∗1 (r, ϕℓ(r)) given by (13), where J is replaced by Jˆ . It follows
from (15) that M(Jˆ) ≥ 0. Thus, π∗1 (r, ϕℓ(r)) is maximized at r∗.
Given J = Jˆ , calculations reveal that π∗1 (r∗, ϕℓ(r∗)) > θ
2
(a+2)2 for
all a ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, with r ≤ rˆ , firm 1’s best strategy is to offer
contract (r∗, ϕℓ(r∗))with payoff π∗1 (r∗, ϕℓ(r∗)). We now compare
the two cases, r > rˆ and r ≤ rˆ . Note that π∗1 (r∗, ϕℓ(r∗)) ≥ θ
2
4
with equality only if a = 1. In addition, if a = 1, then J˜ = Jˆ and
r∗ = rˆ = θ2 . Thus, we conclude that, if 0 ≤ a < 1, the contract
(r∗, ϕℓ(r∗)) is chosen, whereas if a = 1, the contract (r, 0) with
r ≥ rˆ = θ2 is chosen.
Summarizing the above argument, we can state the following
theorem.
Theorem 4. Consider the low development cost scenario J ≤ Jˆ . The
equilibrium path is as follows.Fig. 1. Optimal licensing method vs. the development cost J and the substitution
coefficient a.
(a) If J ≥ J˜ (see (14)) and a < 1, firm 1 offers (r∗, ϕ∗ℓ ), where r∗ is
given by (3) and
ϕ∗ℓ ≡ ϕℓ(r∗) = J −
a(a− 2)(5a2 + 2a− 8)
(a+ 2)2(3a2 − 4)2 θ
2, (16)
which firm 2 accepts, and which yields payoffs of
(π∗1 (r
∗, ϕ∗ℓ ), π
∗
2 (r
∗, ϕ∗ℓ ))
=

a4−4a3−8a2+16
4(a+2)2(−3a2+4)θ
2 + J, θ2
(a+2)2 − J

. (17)
If J ≥ J˜ and a = 1, firm 1 offers contract (r, 0) with r ≥ θ2 ,
which firm 2 accepts, and which generates payoffs of ( θ
2
4 , 0).
(b) If J < J˜ , firm 1 offers a pure royalty contract (r˜, 0) with r˜
in (11), which firm 2 accepts, and which generates payoffs of
(π∗1 (r˜, 0), π
∗
2 (r˜, 0)), where
π∗1 (r˜, 0) =
−3a2 + 8
4
J
+ (a
2 + a− 1)θ2 − (a2 + a− 2)θθ2 − (a+ 2)2J
(a+ 2)2 ,
π∗2 (r˜, 0) =
θ2
(a+ 2)2 − J.
3.3. Discussion
In this subsection, we summarize the results in Theorems 3 and
4 and discuss their implications. The optimal licensing contract
that emerges for various parameters is identified in Fig. 1.
For the high development cost scenario (region A in Fig. 1),
the patent holder maximizes the joint profit with respect to
the royalty rate and extracts all the surplus from the rival firm
through the fixed fee; see Theorem 3. If instead the patent holder
were to extract the surplus through a higher royalty rate then it
would result in too little output from a joint profit maximization
perspective. The patent holder offers a contract that is accepted
if and only if the products are not perfect substitutes because (1)
when the products are the same, entry by the rival firm does not
increase the industry’s potential profit, and (2) the patent holder
is not threatened by the rival’s entry. When the products are the
same, the rival firm’s product need not be in the market for the
patent holder to maximize the surplus extracted from consumers.
However, when the rival firm’s product is an imperfect substitute,
having the rival firm in the market increases the surplus that
can be extracted from consumers. For the high development cost
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coefficient; see (4). This is because maximal consumer surplus
is smaller when product variety is less. If consumers have less
surplus then there is less surplus to extract and less profit to be
earned.
For the low development cost scenario, the patent holder must
work with the constraint that the rival firm will enter on its own
if it is not offered a sufficiently lucrative contract. This constraint
has the implication that the fixed fee may be zero. The patent
holder maximizes the joint profit and extracts as much surplus as
possible from the rival firm subject to the constraint that the rival
firm earns as much profit as it could without a license. Unless the
development cost is very low (region B in Fig. 1), the patent holder
sets the royalty rate as in the high development cost scenario and
charges a positive fixed fee. However, when the development cost
is sufficiently low (region C in Fig. 1), this constraint is strict and
the nonnegativity constraint of the fixed fee is binding.
Both the royalty rate and the fixed fee are nondecreasing in
the development cost; see (3), (11) and (16). This reflects the fact
that a strong patent gives the patent holder an edge. Numerical
methods confirm that the fixed fee is decreasing in the substitution
coefficient; see Fig. 1 in the supplementarymaterial (see Appendix
A). The royalty rate is increasing in the substitution coefficient if
the development cost is sufficiently high for the fixed fee to be
positive (regions A and B); see (3). This is because the royalty rate is
set tomaximize the joint profit. When the development cost is low
(region C), the effect of the substitution coefficient on the royalty
rate is ambiguous; see Fig. 2 in the supplementary material (see
Appendix A). This is because, in a small market in which there is
little product variety, the patent holder prefers a less competitive
rival, and at the same time it has to leave enough profit for the rival.
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